

# Everything is a Race and Nakamoto Always Wins

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# Main Results


- Nakamoto's private double-spend attack is the worst attack: Bitcoin is secure if the private attack fails with high probability.
- Maximum tolerable adversary power is determined by the private attack threshold.
- This is true for three classes of longest chain protocols:
  - ✓ Nakamoto's original Proof-of-Work protocol
  - ✓ Ouroboros and Sleepy Proof-of-Stake protocols
  - ✓ Chia Proof-of-Space protocol

# Let's start with Nakamoto


## Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System

Satoshi Nakamoto  
satoshin@gmx.com  
www.bitcoin.org

# Let's start with Nakamoto




# Nakamoto's Private Attack



**Safety:** Once Tx is k-deep, Tx stays as part of the longest chain.

**Liveness:** Longest chain contains honest blocks.



Private attack fails if  $\lambda_a < \frac{\lambda_h}{1 + \lambda_h \Delta}$

Private attack succeeds if  $\lambda_a > \frac{\lambda_h}{1 + \lambda_h \Delta}$


Can another attack succeed?

# Network Model


- **Synchronous** network with delay  $\Delta$
- Total mining rate:  $\lambda$
- **Byzantine** Adversary with mining rate  $\lambda_a = \beta\lambda$
- Honest mining rate:  $\lambda_h = \lambda - \lambda_a = (1 - \beta)\lambda$
- Blocks arrive via a **Poisson** process of rate  $\lambda$  (in the limit size of time slots approach zero).

# Closing the gap

Given  $\beta = \lambda_a / (\lambda_a + \lambda_h)$  and  $\Delta$ , for what values of blocktime ( $1/\lambda$ ), is Nakamoto's PoW longest chain protocol secure?




← Faster chain



# Other longest chain protocols


DGKR'17, DPC'19  
CP'19






# More results


Proof-of-Work



Ouroboros/Sleepy



Chia Proof-of-Space




# Main Theorems

- If  $\lambda_a < \frac{\lambda_h}{1 + \lambda_h \Delta}$ ,


then the **Nakamoto Proof-of-Work** and the **Ouroboros/Sleepy Proof-of-Stake** protocols generate transaction ledgers such that each transaction  $tx$  satisfies safety and liveness (parameterized by  $\sigma$ ) with probability at least  $1 - e^{-\Omega(\sigma^{1-\varepsilon})}$ , for any  $\varepsilon > 0$ .

- If  $\lambda_a < \frac{1}{e^{1 + \lambda_h \Delta}}$ ,



then the **Chia Proof-of-Space** protocol generates transaction ledgers such that each transaction  $tx$  satisfies safety and liveness (parameterized by  $\sigma$ ) with probability at least  $1 - e^{-\Omega(\sigma^{1-\varepsilon})}$ , for any  $\varepsilon > 0$ .

# Blocktree partitioning





# And Nakamoto Always Wins

Secure against private attack


$$\frac{\lambda_h}{1 + \lambda_h \Delta} > \lambda_{ag}$$

Nakamoto blocks exist and keep arriving.

secure against all attacks

$$\Rightarrow \frac{\lambda_h}{1 + \lambda_h \Delta}$$

fictitious honest chain




$$\Rightarrow \lambda_{ag}$$

Bitcoin & Ouroboros/SnowWhite:

- $\lambda_{ag} \leq \lambda_a$

Chia:

- $\lambda_{ag} \leq e\lambda_a$



# Other Methods


Method	Protocol	Work	Property
Backbone Analysis (block counting)	Nakamoto Proof-of-Work	GKL'15	First to show security for PoW, lock step round-by-round
Convergence Opportunities	Nakamoto Proof-of-Work	PSS'17	Tighter security for PoW, $\Delta$ -synchronous
Forkable Strings	Ouroboros Proof-of-Stake	KRDO'17, DGKR'18, BGK+'18, KQR'20	Tight security in the lock step round-by- round for PoS
Pivots	Sleepy/SnowWhite Proof-of-Stake	PS'17, BPS'16	$\Delta$ -synchronous
Blocktree Partitioning	Any longest chain protocol!	DKT'20	Tight security bound for PoW, PoS, PoSpace

# **Everything is a Race and Nakamoto Always Wins**

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2005.10484>



# Appendix: Branching Random Walk



Lemma: For  $m \geq 1$ ,  $P(D_i(t) \geq m) \leq \left(\frac{e\lambda_a t}{m}\right)^m$

Proof: (Branching Random Walk)



# Appendix: Is private attack the worst attack?


In a statistical sense...



If the private attack fails, the protocol is secure with high probability.


In a deterministic sense...

Only for the Proof-of-Work with network delay  $\Delta = 0$ .



# Appendix: A Different Attack

k deep confirmation rule  
(k = 3)



Balance Attack succeeds!

**Safety:** Once Tx is k-deep, Tx stays as part of the longest chain.

**Liveness:** Longest chain contains honest blocks.

